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Abstract 17 
Utility independence is a central condition in multiattribute utility theory, where 18 
attributes of outcomes are aggregated in the context of risk.  The aggregation of 19 
attributes in the absence of risk is studied in conjoint measurement.  In conjoint 20 
measurement, standard sequences have been widely used to empirically measure and 21 
test utility functions, and to theoretically analyze them.  This paper shows that utility 22 
independence and standard sequences are closely related: Utility independence is 23 
equivalent to a standard sequence invariance condition when applied to risk.  This 24 
simple relation between two widely used conditions in adjacent fields of research is 25 
surprising and useful.  It facilitates the testing of utility independence because 26 
standard sequences are flexible and can avoid cancellation biases that affect direct 27 
tests of utility independence.  Extensions of our results to nonexpected utility models 28 
can now be provided easily.  We discuss applications to the measurement of quality-29 
adjusted life-years (QALY) in the health domain. 30 
 31 
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1. Introduction 1 
 Utility independence is widely used in decision analysis (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; 2 
Guerrero & Herrero, 2005; Engel & Wellman, 2010).  In medical decision making, 3 
utility independence underlies the health utility index, a widely used method to derive 4 
utilities for multiattribute health states (Feeny, Furlong, Torrance, Goldsmith, Zhu, 5 
Depauw, Denton, & Boyle, 2002; Feeny, 2006).  Analyses of utility independence are 6 
usually based on the normatively convincing, but descriptively problematic, expected 7 
utility theory for choices between risky prospects (probability distributions over 8 
outcomes).  Then the condition usually implies that multiattribute utility is additive, 9 
multiplicative, or multilinear. 10 
 Utility independence concerns situations where the levels of some attributes are 11 
fixed deterministically.  The condition then requires that preferences between 12 
prospects over the remaining attributes should be independent of the fixed 13 
deterministic levels.  This requirement has often been tested directly (Miyamoto & 14 
Eraker, 1988; Bleichrodt & Johannesson, 1997; Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2005; Spencer & 15 
Robinson, 2007).  One problem with direct tests of utility independence is that they 16 
induce subjects to ignore the common fixed values, not because this is their true 17 
preference but rather as a heuristic to simplify the task before any consideration of 18 
true preference (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, the cancellation heuristic).  That such 19 
distorting heuristics can sometimes increase consistency, misleadingly suggesting 20 
verification of preference conditions, was emphasized by Loomes, Starmer, & Sugden 21 
(2003).  For direct tests of utility independence the cancellation heuristic will indeed 22 
create artificial support for the condition. 23 
 A second problem with traditional analyses of utility independence is that they 24 
have been based on expected utility maximization.  There is, however, much evidence 25 
that expected utility is violated empirically (Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Kahneman 26 
 3
and Tversky 1979; Starmer, 2000).  Extensions of utility independence to 1 
nonexpected utility models include Bier & Connell (1994), Bleichrodt, Schmidt, & 2 
Zank (2009), Bouyssou & Pirlot (2003), Dyckerhoff (1994), and Miyamoto & 3 
Wakker (1996). 4 
 The aggregation of attributes is also studied in conjoint measurement (Krantz, 5 
Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971).  Unlike multiattribute utility theory and decision 6 
analysis, conjoint measurement does not assume risk to be present.  However, one can 7 
still use the techniques of conjoint measurement in the presence of risk.  This is the 8 
approach to multiattribute utility taken in this paper.  A common technique underlying 9 
many results in conjoint measurement is the construction of standard sequences.1  10 
These are sequences of attribute levels that are equally spaced in utility units, 11 
endogenously derived from preferences without using the utility function.  In 12 
marketing, standard sequences are used in the saw-tooth method (Fishburn, 1967; 13 
Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000).  Krantz et al. (1971) explain the importance of 14 
standard sequences in great detail.  Many preference conditions amount to invariance 15 
of particular standard sequences.  By imposing such specific invariance conditions, 16 
specific functional forms of the multiattribute utility function can be derived.2 17 
 This paper shows that there exists a surprisingly simple relation between 18 
multiattribute utility and conjoint measurement: utility independence is equivalent to a 19 
version of standard sequence invariance.  This opens new and useful ways to analyze 20 
utility independence.  Standard sequence techniques are flexible and efficient and they 21 
                                                 
1 See Abdellaoui (2000), Baron (2008, Chs. 10 and 14), Booij & van de Kuilen (2009), Fishburn & 
Rubinstein (1982, pp. 682-3 and Figure 1), Loewenton & Luce (1966), von Winterfeldt & Edwards 
(1986, p. 267). 
2  See Bouyssou & Pirlot (2004), Ebert (2004), Fishburn & Edwards (1997, Axiom 8), Gilboa, 
Schmeidler, & Wakker (2002) Harvey (1986, p. 1126), Casadesus-Masanell, Klibanoff, & Ozdenoren 
(2000), Krantz et al. (1971), Nau (2006, Axiom 4), Schmidt (2003), Skiadas (1997) , Stigler (1950), 
Tversky & Kahneman (1992), Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic (1988), Wakker (1984), Wakker (2010), 
Wakker & Tversky (1993). 
 4
can avoid the aforementioned cancellation bias.  Further, they give direct quantitative 1 
measurements of utility, which is useful in its own right.  They do not directly appeal 2 
to risk, as does utility independence, but they focus on tradeoffs between attributes, 3 
avoiding the complications of risky decisions.  Finally, they can easily be extended to 4 
nonexpected utility models, offering the possibility to design tests of utility 5 
independence that are robust to violations of expected utility. 6 
 7 
2. Notation 8 
 We start by assuming a simple model on a simple domain (a rank-ordered set of 9 
binary prospects) that is present as a substructure in expected utility but also in most 10 
nonexpected utility models.  In all these models, the theorems that we obtain within 11 
the simple model immediately extend to the whole model.  Consequently, our main 12 
result, Observation 5.2, applies to all these (non)expected utility models.  Miyamoto 13 
and Wakker (1996) similarly used rank-ordered binary prospects to obtain results for 14 
many nonexpected utility theories. 15 
 We consider decision under uncertainty with one event E.  E is uncertain in the 16 
sense that the decision maker does not know for sure if it is true (“will happen”) or 17 
not.  An objective probability p of E may (the case of risk) or may not (the case of 18 
uncertainty and ambiguity) be given.  Our analysis applies to either case.   We 19 
consider prospects x E y yielding outcome x if E is true and outcome y otherwise.  If an 20 
objective probability p is given for E, then we can also write x p y.  X denotes the 21 
outcome set. 22 
 A preference relation  is given over the outcomes.  The domain of prospects is 23 
rank-ordered: We assume without further mention that always  x  y in prospects x E y.  24 
 5
The resulting rank-ordered3 set of prospects is denoted X2.  A preference relation ´ is 1 
given on X2.  Constant prospects, x E x, yielding outcome x for sure are identified with 2 
that outcome x.  The preference relation ´ generated over outcomes is assumed to 3 
agree with .  Thus ´ defined over prospects is an extension of  defined over 4 
outcomes.  We will therefore write  instead of ´ henceforth.  Strict preference and 5 
indifference are defined as usual, and are denoted  and ~. 6 
 We assume that the outcome set X is a two-attribute product set Q  T, with 7 
generic element x = (Q,T).  Q designates the first attribute and T designates the 8 
second, and Q and T are attribute sets.  For example, if outcomes are chronic health 9 
states then Q designates a health state and T designates a time period (life duration).  10 
The extension of our results to cases of more than two attributes will be presented in 11 
§5. 12 
 We assume throughout that preferences over prospects (Q1,T1) E (Q2,T2) can be 13 
represented by 14 
 U(Q1,T1) + (1)U(Q2,T2). (2.1) 15 
Here U: QT  — is the utility function, whose particular form is the central topic of 16 
multiattribute utility and of this paper.  The decision weight of event E is 0 <  < 1.  17 
Equation (2) includes virtually all decision theories known today.  Well-known 18 
examples are: (a) Expected utility where  = P(E) is the probability of event E, 19 
objective in the case of risk and subjective in the case of uncertainty; (b) rank-20 
dependent utility for risk (Quiggin, 1982) where  = w(p) with p the objective 21 
probability of event E and w a probability weighting function; (c) rank-dependent 22 
utility for uncertainty (also called Choquet expected utility) or prospect theory where 23 
                                                 
3 Another widely used term in the literature is comonotonic. 
 6
 = W(E) with W a nonadditive weighting function or capacity (for gains under 1 
prospect theory); (d) maxmin expected utility (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989).  Further 2 
details are in the footnote to Observation 5.2, and in Wakker (2010, §§6.11 and 10.6). 3 
 4 
3. Utility independence 5 
 The second attribute T is utility independent if 6 
    (Q,T1) E (Q,T2)    (Q,T3) E (Q,T4) 7 
                             8 
    (Q,T1) E (Q,T2)  (Q,T3) E (Q,T4) (3.1) 9 
for all Q,Q and for all T1,T2,T3,T4.  That is, preferences do not depend on the 10 
particular deterministic level at which Q is fixed.  As throughout, it is implicitly 11 
assumed that all prospects are contained in X2.  Preferential independence is utility 12 
independence restricted to constant prospects: 13 
    (Q,T1)  (Q,T3) 14 
               15 
    (Q,T1)  (Q,T3). (3.2) 16 
In economic consumer theory, preferential independence is known as separability of 17 
T, and in conjoint measurement (Krantz et al., 1971) it is part of joint independence.  18 
Preferential independence implies that we can define preferences over the second 19 
attribute T independently from the first attribute.  It is naturally satisfied if T is an 20 
interval and monotonicity holds.  A convenient implication of preferential 21 
independence is that changing Q in Eq. 3.1 does not affect rank-ordering.  That is, the 22 
upper two prospects in Eq. 3.1 are contained in X2 if and only if the lower two are. 23 
 7
 Utility independence of T holds if U is additive (U(Q,T) = V(Q) + W(T)) or 1 
multiplicative (U(Q,T) = V(Q)W(T)) with all values V(Q) of the same sign, which 2 
can then be taken positive.  Under additional conditions, utility independence is not 3 
only necessary, but also sufficient for U being additive or multiplicative (Miyamoto 4 
and Wakker, 1996, Theorem 3).  Then, in Eq. 3.3 below, f or g has to be constant.  5 
The following theorem extends a well known result from classical setups to our 6 
domain  X2. 7 
 8 
THEOREM 3.1.  Assume that the image of the function T # U(Q,T) is an interval for 9 
all Q.  Then T is utility independent if and only if 10 
 U(Q,T) = f(Q)V(T) + g(Q) (3.3) 11 
for some functions f, V, g with f positive.   12 
 13 
4. Standard sequence invariance 14 
 A convenient feature of the standard sequence technique introduced next is that it 15 
is directly related to the empirical measurement of utility.  T0, …, Tn is a (Q-)standard 16 
sequence if there exist Q*, Tg, and TG such that, for i = 0,…, n1, 17 
 (Q*,Tg) E (Q,Ti+1) ~ (Q*,TG) E (Q,Ti) . (4.1) 18 
(Q*,Tg) and (Q*,TG) are called gauge outcomes.  They serve as a measuring rod to 19 
peg out the standard sequence.  For later purposes, it is of interest to note that Q* and 20 
Q can be different. The proof of the following lemma is given in the main text 21 
because it may be clarifying. 22 
 23 
 8
LEMMA 4.1.  Under Eq. 2.1, a Q-standard sequence is equally spaced in utility units 1 
(U(Q,Ti+1)  U(Q,Ti) is independent of i). 2 
 3 
PROOF.  By Eq. 2.1, the (1) weighted differences U(Q,Ti+1)  U(Q,Ti) all match 4 
exactly the same  weighted difference U(Q*,TG)  U(Q*,Tg).   5 
 6 
 We now turn to comparisons of standard sequences for different values of Q.  A 7 
Q-standard sequence T0, T1, T2,… and a Q´-standard sequence T0´, T1´, T2´, … are 8 
inconsistent if they satisfy T0 = T0´ and T1 = T1´, but, for some i > 1, Ti and Ti´ are not 9 
equivalent in the sense that (Q, Ti) /~ (Q, Ti´) or (Q´, Ti)  /~ (Q´, Ti´).4  Under Eq. 2.1, 10 
inconsistencies are possible because equal spacedness for U(Q,.) need not correspond 11 
with equal spacedness for U(Q´,.).  Standard sequence invariance on T means that 12 
such inconsistencies are excluded for all Q, Q´  Q. 13 
 14 
THEOREM 4.2.  Assume Eq. 2.1, with the image of the function T # U(Q,T) an 15 
interval for each Q.  Preferential independence of T and standard sequence invariance 16 
on T hold if and only if 17 
 U(Q,T) = f(Q)V(T) + g(Q) (4.2) 18 
for some functions f, V, g with f positive.   19 
 20 
 The comparison of Theorems 3.1 and 4.2 establishes an interesting connection 21 
between conjoint measurement and multiattribute utility because the necessary and 22 
sufficient form in Eq. 3.3 is identical to that in Eq. 4.2: Under preferential 23 
 9
independence and richness, standard sequence invariance on T is equivalent to utility 1 
independence of T!  That is, we can test utility independence by testing standard 2 
sequence invariance.  We can now for instance reduce the cancellation heuristic by 3 
taking different Q and Q* in Eq. 4.1.  This way, we can avoid biases that have 4 
distorted traditional tests of utility independence.  We will state the relations between 5 
utility independence and standard sequence invariance formally in the following 6 
section. 7 
 We next provide an axiomatization of multiplicative utility, useful for QALY 8 
measurement in health (§6).  We call T0T a null element if (R,T0) ~ (R´,T0) for all R 9 
and R´. 10 
 11 
OBSERVATION 4.3.  Assume that Eqs. 2.1 and 4.2 hold.  If T contains a null element 12 
then g(Q) is constant and can be taken equal to 0, giving a multiplicative 13 
representation 14 
 U(Q,T) = f(Q)V(T) . (4.3) 15 
 16 
 17 
 For similar results, see Miyamoto, Wakker, Bleichrodt, & Peters (1998, Theorem 18 
3.1) and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2005, Theorem 2).  A remarkable implication of the 19 
above result is that Q then also is utility independent on the subdomain where V is 20 
positive (which excludes the null element). 21 
 We have defined standard sequences for outcomes under not-E, that is, outcomes 22 
ranked worst and less preferred than the gauge outcomes.  Standard sequences can 23 
                                                                                                                                            
4 It can be seen that Eq. 2.1 implies Q´  Q.  
 10
equally well be defined for outcomes under E, when they are ranked best and are 1 
preferred to the gauge outcomes, using the following indifferences: 2 
 (Q,Ti+1) E (Q*,Tg) ~ (Q,Ti) E (Q*,TG). (4.4) 3 
For representation theorems, the topic of this paper, it is desirable to use weak 4 
preference conditions in order to obtain the logically strongest theorems.  For 5 
empirical investigations it can be interesting to consider more restrictive preference 6 
conditions, to obtain more possibilities to falsify a theory or to measure its concepts.  7 
Hence, for empirical purposes it may be interesting to also consider standard 8 
sequences defined in Eq. 4.4 and to investigate consistency properties between such 9 
larger classes of standard sequences.  It easily follows that we should also have 10 
invariance here under Eq. 4.2. 11 
 Remark A.2 will indicate a mathematical generalization of our theorems that we 12 
do not present in the main text because it loses the empirically attractive reduction of 13 
the cancellation heuristic.  An interesting feature of the weaker preference condition 14 
used there is that it is a common weakening of utility independence and standard 15 
sequence invariance.  Thus the two conditions are different strengthenings of a 16 
common underlying necessary and sufficient condition.  This observation clarifies the 17 
mathematical nature of our results. 18 
 19 
5. Generalizations and main result 20 
 We first extend our results to n-attribute utility.  Assume that X is X1  ...  Xn for 21 
a natural number n  2, with generic element (x1, …, xn).  Let I  {1,…,n} and write T 22 
= iIXi and Q = iIXi.  We can write X = Q  T.  Utility independence of I is 23 
defined as utility independence of T (Eq. 3.1).  That is, if the attribute levels outside 24 
 11
of I are kept fixed at deterministic levels, then the preferences generated over 1 
prospects over T are independent of the deterministic levels chosen.  We can define 2 
standard sequences on iIXi exactly as in Eq. 4.1, where now Tg, Ti+1, TG, Ti 3 
jIXj, and Q*, Q  iIXi.  Standard sequence invariance on iIXi requires 4 
consistency between standard sequences in iIXi for all Q and Q in iIXi.  The 5 
following theorem immediately follows from Theorems 3.1 and 4.2. 6 
 7 
THEOREM 5.1.  Assume a preference  on X2, with X = X1  ...  Xn, and I  {1,…,n}.  8 
Let T = iIXi and Q = iIXi.  Preferences are represented by Eq. 2.1 (with T = 9 
(xi)iI and Q = (xi)iI).  The image of (xi)iI # U((xj)jI,(xi)iI) is an interval for each 10 
(xj)jI.  Then I is utility independent if and only if iIXi is preferentially independent 11 
and standard sequence invariance on iIXi holds.   12 
 13 
 We next consider decision theories defined on general domains of prospects, 14 
leading to our main result.  Now prospects can be probability distributions over 15 
outcomes with more than one probability involved, or mappings from multi-element 16 
state spaces to outcomes, and prospects need not all have the same rank-ordering.  17 
The definition of utility independence needs no adaptation: On all subproduct 18 
domains, preference is independent of the deterministic level at which outside 19 
attributes are kept fixed.  We define standard sequence invariance by defining 20 
standard sequences on all subsets isomorphic to X2 (two outcomes and a fixed event 21 
or probability, always with the same rank ordering).  No inconsistencies should result 22 
both within sets X2 and across different sets X
2
.  In many theories, this definition can 23 
be extended.  For example, under rank-dependent utility it can be extended to all 24 
 12
multi-event sets of prospects that are comonotonic (defined in Wakker 2010, §10.12).  1 
For brevity, we do not elaborate on this point. 2 
 3 
OBSERVATION 5.2.  Let X = X1  ...  Xn be a set of outcomes, and let  be a 4 
preference relation on a set of prospects.  Prospects can be probability distributions 5 
over X (risk), or functions from a state space S to X (uncertainty).  The set of 6 
prospects is rich enough to contain a set of the form X2.  Preferences are represented 7 
by a model that implies Eq. 2.1 on X2 with the same utility function U as in Eq. 2.1 8 
used throughout the domain.  The utility function is an interval scale, i.e. preferences 9 
are not affected if a constant is added to utility or if utility is multiplied by a positive 10 
constant.5  If, for a set I  {1,…,n}, the utility image of iIXi is an interval whenever 11 
the attributes outside of I are kept fixed, then utility independence of I is equivalent to 12 
preferential independence and standard sequence invariance on iIXi.   13 
 14 
6. An application to health 15 
 This section applies the above results to medical decision making.  Outcomes 16 
(Q,T) are chronic health states, with Q describing the constant health state and T the 17 
life duration spent in this health state, followed by death.  Unlike in economics or 18 
psychology, statistical probabilities of risks are often available in the health domain.  19 
We will assume that prospects are probability distributions over chronic health states. 20 
                                                 
5 The requirements in our observation hold for most theories that are popular today.  These include 
expected utility for risk (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and for uncertainty (Savage, 1954), 
rank-dependent utility for risk (Quiggin, 1982) and for uncertainty (Gilboa, 1987; Schmeidler, 1989), 
prospect theory if there are only gains (Luce & Fishburn, 1991; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), 
disappointment aversion theory (Gul, 1991), maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; 
Wald, 1950) and the -maxmin model (Hurwicz, 1951; Jaffray, 1994), contraction expected utility 
(Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, & Vergnaud, 2008), and binary rank-dependent utility (Luce, 2000, Ch. 3; 
Ghirardato & Marinacci, 2001; Wakker, 2010, §§6.11, 10.6).  Observation 5.2 applies to all these 
theories. 
 13
 The utility of life duration T is described by a function V.  The commonly found 1 
subjective time preferences and discounting imply that V is concave, with future life 2 
years contributing less to V than the first life years to come.  Since the 1980s it has 3 
become customary to correct life duration for quality of life, leading to the QALY 4 
model f(Q)V(T), where f designates the correction factor due to the subjective quality 5 
of life of health state Q. The QALY model is widely used in health policy. 6 
 Preference axiomatizations can serve to justify the use of QALYs as outcome 7 
measure (Pliskin, Shepard, & Weinstein, 1980; Miyamoto & Eraker, 1988; Bleichrodt 8 
& Quiggin, 1997; Bleichrodt, Wakker, & Johannesson, 1997; Miyamoto et al., 1998; 9 
Miyamoto, 1999; Bleichrodt & Miyamoto, 2003; Doctor & Miyamoto, 2003; Doctor, 10 
Bleichrodt, Miyamoto, Temkin, & Dikmen, 2004; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005).  11 
Observation 4.3, combined with Theorem 4.2, provides a new foundation of the 12 
QALY model with standard sequence invariance instead of utility independence.  13 
Here T = 0 life years naturally serves as the null element required by Observation 4.3.  14 
Standard sequence invariance entails that tradeoffs between life-years (discounting) 15 
are not different under different health states.  This condition will sometimes be more 16 
intuitive than utility independence, which appeals to risk attitudes for life-years rather 17 
than to direct tradeoffs between life-years and intertemporal preferences. 18 
 Obviously, if standard sequence invariance is prescriptively objectionable then 19 
Observation 4.3 shows that the QALY model is prescriptively objectionable.  20 
Standard sequence invariance can also be used to test the descriptive (rather than 21 
prescriptive) validity of the QALY model.  A tractable way of testing is as follows.  22 
First elicit a Q-standard sequence T0,T1,…Tk through indifferences 23 
 (Q*,Tg) p (Q,Ti+1) ~ (Q*,TG) p (Q,Ti) . 24 
 14
as in Eq. 4.1, where the new value to be elicited in each indifference has been printed 1 
bold.  Next take a health state Q´  Q and a health state Q**, which can be but need 2 
not be different from Q*.  Then use a “bridge” question 3 
 (Q**,Tg) p (Q´,T1) ~ (Q**,TG´) p (Q´,T0) 4 
to find new gauge outcomes (Q**,Tg)6 and (Q**,TG´) that should provide the same 5 
standard sequence starting with T0 and T1.  Then elicit a second standard sequence T0, 6 
T1,…,Tk: 7 
 (Q**,Tg) p (Q´,T i+1) ~ (Q**,TG´) p (Q´,Ti). 8 
We can then test whether the two standard sequences agree, as required by standard 9 
sequence invariance and the QALY model.  A useful spinoff of these measurements is 10 
that they directly measure the utility functions (i.e., discounting) for life duration 11 
under Q and Q´ (Wakker & Deneffe, 1996).  If these are different under Q than under 12 
Q´ then the QALY model is violated. 13 
 The measurements proposed above are chained, with answers to one question 14 
serving as input of next questions.  A drawback of chaining is that errors propagate.  15 
Our consistency questions indicated that the errors in most responses were modest.  16 
Simulation studies for standard sequences have suggested that the problem of error 17 
propagation is not very serious (Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000, p. 1495; Abdellaoui, 18 
Vossmann, & Weber, 2005, p. 1394, §5.3 end; Bleichrodt, Cillo, & Diecidue, 2010, p. 19 
164; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2011; Conte, Hey, & Moffatt, 2011). 20 
 21 
7. Conclusion 22 
 15
 We have demonstrated that standard sequences, a tool commonly used in conjoint 1 
measurement (where no risk is assumed), can also be used in multiattribute utility 2 
theory (where risk is assumed).  They provide convenient tools to characterize and 3 
analyze utility independence, the most widely used preference condition in 4 
multiattribute utility theory.  In particular, they facilitate the study of the QALY 5 
model for health decisions. 6 
 7 
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Appendix.  Proofs 12 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1.  That the functional form implies utility independence 13 
follows from substitution.  Hence we assume utility independence, and derive the 14 
functional form. 15 
 Fix a Q*.  If the corresponding utility interval is one-point, then by utility 16 
independence preference is independent of T, V is constant, and everything follows.  17 
Hence, assume that the interval is nonpoint.  Then with V(T) = U(Q*,T), this function 18 
is an interval scale in the representation (T1,T2)  V(T1) + (1)V(T2), which 19 
means that it is unique up to level and unit.  This uniqueness is well known if we have 20 
an expected utility representation on the full, nonrank-ordered, product set T2 21 
(resulting from X2 by keeping Q = Q* fixed), which is a special case of an additive 22 
conjoint representation with Krantz et al.´s (1971) restricted solvability satisfied.7  It 23 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Tg can but need not be equal to Tg.  
7 Here, and in what follows, we have continuity with respect to the product topology of the order 
topology generated over T, where the crucial point is that this topology is connected (it is also 
 16
is also well known if we have a rank-dependent representation on the full product set 1 
T2 (Wakker, 1991).  That it also holds when restricted to the rank-ordered set T2 2 
(resulting from X2 by keeping Q = Q* fixed) as in our setup follows from Chateauneuf 3 
& Wakker (1993, Theorem 2.2 and Lemma C.4). 4 
 By utility independence the same preferences hold over pairs (T1,T2) with Q fixed 5 
at every other level Q´  Q*.  By interval scaling, we have U(Q´,T) = f(Q´)V(T) + 6 
g(Q´) with f(Q´) positive.  This way we obtain the functions f and g.   7 
 8 
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2.  If the functional form in the theorem holds, then all Ts are 9 
ordered by V, implying preferential independence.  Further, then all standard 10 
sequences are equally spaced in V units, and they must be consistent.  This implies 11 
standard sequence invariance on T. 12 
 In the rest of this proof we assume standard sequence invariance on T and 13 
preferential independence and derive Eq. 4.2.  By preferential independence we can 14 
define a preference relation over T independently of Q, that we will denote .  Thus T 15 
 T´ if (Q,T)  (Q,T´) for some Q, which then holds for all Q. 16 
 Take some Q  Q*.  Define V(T) = U(Q,T) and V*(T) = U(Q*,T).  By 17 
preferential independence, V and V* both represent  over T and V* = V for a 18 
strictly increasing  that is continuous because it maps an interval onto an interval. 19 
 Take a T with V(T) in the interior of V(T).  Hence, T is not maximal in T.  T will 20 
be fixed until the last lines in the proof.  Define an open interval S around V(T) so 21 
small that there is a “dominating” interval D in V(T) above the interval S large 22 
                                                                                                                                            
topologically separable).  The result can be seen in more elementary terms if we transform all values T 
into V(T), giving a weighted additive representation with linear value functions. 
 17
enough to imply, for all T1 and T0 in V1(S), existence of Tg and TG in V1(D) such 1 
that 2 
 (Q,Tg) E (Q,T1) ~ (Q,TG) E (Q,T0). (A.1) 3 
In words: each (1) weighted V difference in S can be matched by a -weighted V 4 
difference in D. 5 
 We similarly define an open interval S* around V*(T) so small that there is a 6 
dominating interval D* in V*(T) above the interval S* large enough to imply, for all 7 
T1 and T0 in V*1(S*), existence of Tg* and TG* in V*1(D*) such that 8 
 (Q*,Tg*) E (Q*,T1) ~ (Q*,TG*) E (Q*,T0). (A.2) 9 
That is, each (1) weighted V* difference in S* can be matched by a -weighted V* 10 
difference in D*. 11 
 Take a T+  T so close to T that both V(T+)  S and V*(T+)  S*.  Similarly, take 12 
a T  T so close to T that both V(T)  S and V*(T)  S*.  We consider the 13 
preference interval {T´T: T  T´  T+} around T and two of its elements T0  T2.  14 
We can find T1 such that T0, T1, and T2 are equally spaced in V units, and T1* such 15 
that T0, T1* and T2 are equally spaced in V* units. 16 
 17 
 18
LEMMA A.1.  T1 ~ T1*. 1 
 2 
PROOF.  (The end of the proof of this lemma will be indicated by QED.)  For 3 
contradiction, assume T1  T1* (the case with  is similar and is not discussed).  4 
Because the V values of T0, T1, and T2 are contained in V1(S), there exist Tg and TG 5 
in V1(D) such that, for i = 0: 6 
 (Q,Tg) E (Q,Ti+1) ~ (Q,TG) E (Q,Ti). (A.3) 7 
Because T2 and T1 have the same V difference as T1 and T0, Eq. A.3 also holds for i = 8 
1.  That is, T0, T1, T2 is a Q-standard sequence. 9 
 Because T1  T1*, we can find T2*  T2 such that T0, T1, T2* are equally spaced in 10 
V* units. 11 
 Similar to Eq. A.3, because the V* values of T0, T1, and T2* are contained in 12 
V*1(S*), there exist Tg* and TG* in V*1(D*) such that 13 
 (Q*,Tg*) E (Q*,T1) ~ (Q*,TG*) E (Q*,T0) (A.4) 14 
and 15 
 (Q*,Tg*) E (Q*,T2*) ~ (Q*,TG*) E (Q*,T1). (A.5) 16 
Eqs. A.4 and A.5 imply that T0, T1, T2* is a Q*-standard sequence.  Because T2*  T2, 17 
a contradiction results with standard sequence invariance on T.  QED 18 
 19 
 Because T1 ~ T1*, T1 (and also T1*) is both the V and the V* midpoint of T0 and 20 
T2.  Hence, on {T´T: T  T´  T+}, V and V* midpoints are the same.  With V* = 21 
V, the continuous function  satisfies ((v1 + v2)/2) = ((v1) + (v2))/2 on the 22 
 19
interval (V(T), V(T+)) around V(T).  It must be affine on this interval (Aczel, 1966 1 
§2.1.3) and have second derivative 0 there, including at T. 2 
 The continuous and strictly increasing  has second derivative 0 at all T in the 3 
interior of its domain V(T).  This implies that it is affine everywhere.  Hence V*(T) = 4 
U(Q*,T) = f(Q*)V(T) + g(Q*) for a positive f(Q*).  This implies Eq. 4.2. 5 
 6 
REMARK A.2.  In this proof, we only used standard sequences in Eq. 4.1 with Q* = Q.  7 
Hence the theorem remains valid if we define standard sequences only for Q* = Q in 8 
Eq. 4.1, and impose standard sequence invariance only for those standard sequences.  9 
The resulting condition is mathematically interesting because it is a common 10 
weakening of utility independence and standard sequence invariance, implying that 11 
the resulting modification of Theorem 4.2 is an immediate generalization of the 12 
theorems with utility independence in the literature.  We chose the stronger version of 13 
standard sequence invariance in our main text because it is empirically more useful.  14 
 15 
 16 
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 4.3.  Substituting the null element in Eq. 4.2 shows that g(Q) 17 
must be constant.  It can be taken 0 because U is an interval scale.   18 
 19 
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 5.2.  Assume utility independence on a set of the form X2.  20 
This implies Eq. 3.3 for utility.  This, in turn, implies utility independence on the 21 
whole domain of prospects because changing the deterministic level of some 22 
attributes amounts to an interval rescaling of utility, which does not affect preference.  23 
Utility independence on the whole domain trivially implies utility independence on 24 
the set X2.  Hence Eq. 3.3 and the two versions of utility independence are equivalent. 25 
 20
 Next assume standard sequence invariance on a set of the form X2.  This implies 1 
Eq. 4.2 for utility.  This, in turn, implies standard sequence invariance on every set 2 
isomorphic to a set X2.  Hence Eq. 4.2 and the two versions of standard sequence 3 
invariance are equivalent. 4 
 5 
REMARK A.3.  Although we did not formally define standard sequences on larger 6 
domains, it can readily be seen that such versions are easy to obtain.  Replacing the 7 
deterministic level of some attributes amounts to an interval rescaling of utility, which 8 
does not alter equal spacedness of utility on, for instance, comonotonic subsets under 9 
rank-dependent utility.   10 
 11 
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